A simple yet very important question for the study of democratization is how to explain the transformation of a group of individual legislators to a number of unified, disciplined political parties. Parties are considered by many to be the linchpin of democratic politics yet they are not a foregone conclusion, and we see variation in the timing and strength of party development — in some cases parties are “strong” and gain formal control over political activity, while in other cases parties remain fragmented and play much less of a role in politics. In the context of a new democracy, parties originate as legislative groupings, and the party system is unstructured and uncertain. Parties are also often viewed negatively and equated with self-serving factions from the prior regime. In this context, why would legislators choose to give up legislative independence by granting significant formal power to parties in a new democracy?
My dissertation examines the legislative institutionalization of parties, and how endogenous legislative reforms affect party formation and party development. As part of my dissertation, I use a lab experimental to analyze the tradeoff of changing institutional rules in bargaining, representing giving parties significant legislative responsibilities in a new democracy. I also utilize the historical case of the French Third Republic to theorize incentives for legislative reforms that empower parties, using an instrumental variable approach in the form of an exogenous income shock in the 1860s to explain how changing district demographics cause incumbents to build formal institutions.
Pieces of this work have been presented at Columbia’s Political Economy breakfast in Spring 2012, EPSA 2013, and APSA in September 2013.
Taking a Closer Look at Organized Interests in the EU. Perspectives on Europe. 2012. Volume 42: 2.
Article that looks at how internal organization and group resources affects lobbying activity. Based on a series of in-depth, elite interviews with EU interest group leaders conducted the summer of 2011.
Trade sanctions in international environmental policy: Deterring or encouraging free riding? (with Johannes Urpelainen). September 2012, Conflict Management and Peace Science.
This paper presents a game theoretic model of the use of strategic carbon tariffs in international environmental cooperation.
Political Market Failure? How Government Strength Influences Technology Policy (with Johannes Urpelainen). Forthcoming, Technovation.
Governments can implement technology policies that allow the society to solve social problems at a lower cost. We argue that in industrialized democracies, salient social problems provoke an effective technology policy response when the government is unified. We test this theory against data on public energy R&D in 22 OECD countries, 1980-2007.
EUSA Book Review (Winter 2012 Issue) of Elizabeth Bomberg, John Peterson and Richard Corbett (eds.). The European Union: How Does it Work? Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Review here Bomberg_Peterson_Corbett – Cirone.
“Politics as a Male Domain and Empowerment in India.” (with Rohini Pande and Lori Beaman). Chapter in The Impact of Gender Quotas (2012), edited by Franceschet, Krook, Piscopo. Oxford University Press.
- APSA 2013; MPSA 2011, 2013; EPSA 2011, 2013
- CEU Workshop on European Integration, 2013
- Council on European Studies (CES), 2012
- European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Conference in Boston, March 3-5 2011
- Third Annual Princeton Workshop on European Integration, May 4, 2011.
He clearly wants parties.